
















































What comes to mind when you think about Iceland? Until recently, chances are it con-
jured up images of puffins or geysers or maybe Björk – or, if you’re a history buff, Ron-
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Today, alas, nostalgic thoughts have been crowded out by 
the grim reality of the financial meltdown: no economy 
on earth suffered comparably severe damage. T44 The Milken Institute Review
Iceland’s three main financial institutions, 
which accounted for 85 percent of its banking 
system, crashed within a single week in Octo-
ber 2008. All three (along with the govern-
ment that had encouraged their forays into 
the Himalayas of global finance) claimed that 
they  were  merely  pawns  caught  in  Wall 
Street’s  nefarious  games.  But  the  truth  is 
more sobering. For this crisis has exposed the 
fundamental weakness of Iceland’s economic 
and political cultures, which are hobbled by 
institutions more akin to those of the Third 
World than the First. 
how iceland caught up
To understand Iceland’s fall from grace, one 
must understand how it managed to do so 
well for so long. When Iceland was granted 
home rule from Denmark in 1904, income 
per capita was about half that of its colonial 
parent – a miserable $1,500 in today’s pur-
chasing power. But the island’s people were 
better prepared for modernity that one might 
infer from that figure. Going back as far as 
1800, most Icelanders were literate. Thus, it 
should not be entirely surprising that Iceland 
managed to average about a half a percentage 
point faster growth than Denmark over the 
course of the 20th century, or that this mod-
est advantage enabled Iceland to catch up. 
What’s  more,  it  used  the  income  well, 
transforming an island in the middle of the 
North Atlantic into a prosperous state with 
little or no poverty. In 2006, the United Na-
tions Human Development Index ranked Ice-
land first in the world, tied with egalitarian, 
oil-glutted Norway.
Over the years, Iceland accumulated vari-
ous sorts of capital at a rapid pace: physical 
capital  through  investment;  human  capital 
through  education;  foreign  capital  through 
trade; and social capital through democracy, 
institution-building and a dedication to equal-
ity. Natural capital also played a role – first, in 
the form of rich fishing grounds (thanks to the 
Gulf Stream), and later in hydropower and 
geothermal  energy.  Even  the  preference  for 
small families (and the lack of hospitality to 
immigrants), which kept Iceland’s total popu-
lation of 320,000 below that of Bakersfield, 
Calif., proved no economic handicap. To the 
contrary:  the  inefficiencies  associated  with 
lack of scale were probably more than offset by 
the gains linked to social cohesion. 
In foreign relations, Iceland deferred to its 
Nordic  neighbors.  It  entered  the  European 
Economic Area along with Finland, Norway 
and Sweden in 1994, which gave it easy access 
to European markets. But Iceland chose to re-
main  apart  from  the  European  Union  –  a 
choice that reflected some Icelanders’ prefer-
ence to chart an independent economic course. 
In  domestic  affairs,  Iceland  departed  in 
some  ways  from  the  Nordic  norm.  While 
two-thirds of Icelanders live in greater Reyk-
javik, rural areas are vastly over-represented 
in the Icelandic parliament – and institutions 
were accordingly skewed in favor of farmers, 
fishing boat owners and local businesses. Free 
markets were viewed with skepticism, if not 
outright hostility. The state owned the large 
commercial banks and used them to allocate 
subsidized loans and to ration access to for-
eign currency. There was no way to borrow to 
build a fence, buy a car or obtain dollars to go 
abroad without kissing the rings of political 
functionaries. 
This  was,  it  should  be  added,  capital  ra-
tioning with a human face. Even so, the all-
encompassing role of the political class in the 
economy inevitably led to the soft corruption 
of patronage and to influence-peddling. 
Thor Gylfason is professor of economics at the 
University of Iceland.
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The  stories  are  legend.  Party  cronies 
usurped  representation  of  major  firms  like 
Coca-Cola and General Motors by convinc-
ing  their  foreigner  partners  that  only  they 
would be able to procure the permits needed 
to import foreign exchange. Political leaders 
sat on the boards of the banks, looking after 
supporters in the business community who 
could not manage without preferred access to 
capital. 
Bank profits were in effect channeled to fa-
vored  clients  through  low-interest  loans, 
while losses were passed on to the public in 
the form of high fees and state backing of 
bank  liabilities.  This  convenient  bargain  – 
privatizing  the  gains  and  nationalizing  the 
losses – was rarely challenged. The political 
opposition, after all, had representatives on 
the bank boards, too. The newspapers, mostly 
organs of the political parties, stayed in line, 
as did prosecutors and the courts. 
lopsided liberalization
Two waves of liberalization of the policy re-
gime did relieve some of the economic drag 
associated with Iceland’s brand of crony capi-
talism. The first, in the early 1960s, drastically 
reduced  subsidies  to  the  fishing  industry  – 
subsidies that had absorbed an astounding 40 
percent  of  the  government’s  budget.  The 
While  two-thirds  of  Icelanders  live  in  greater  Reykjavik, 
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króna  was  also  devalued,  making  Icelandic 
enterprises more competitive in export mar-
kets. But as economic reforms go, this one fell 
short. For one thing, it left the banks – and 
thus the allocation of capital – in the hands of 
politicians. More generally, it did not loosen 
the suffocating embrace between producers 
and their patrons in government. 
A second wave of liberalization in the 1980s 
deregulated interest rates. This made it possi-
ble for those rates to rise above the (chroni-
cally high) rate of inflation, reducing the im-
plicit subsidies funneled through the banks. 
Selective forgiveness of non-performing loans 
effectively took the place of credit rationing. 
Once  Iceland  joined  the  European  Eco-
nomic  Area  in  1994,  the  government  effec-
tively abandoned controls over trade and cap-
ital  flows.  The  privatization  of  commercial 
banks and investment funds followed from 
1998 to 2003. But before analyzing the impact 
of  the  deregulation  and  privatization  of  fi-
nancial markets, it makes sense to look more 
closely at the broader real economy.
Iceland may have come out on top of the 
UN’s  Human  Development  Index  in  2006 
(and a more-than-respectable third in 2009), 
but it lagged by narrower measures of eco-
nomic development. In 2008, the purchasing 
power generated per hour worked in Iceland 
averaged $40 – far below Norway ($69), the 
United States ($55) and Germany ($50), and 
even a bit below Italy and Spain. Icelanders 
certainly live well, but only by working longer 
hours than other Europeans. The best expla-
nation: protection of agriculture and a lack of 
competition in key sectors (notably banking) 
raise the cost of living and weigh heavily on 
productivity.
Other factors are at play here, too. Iceland 
lags in investment in machinery and equip-
ment, most likely because the financial sector 
favored less-productive investment in real es-
tate. And despite great strides on the educa-
tion front in recent years, the share of the Ice-
landic labor force (25- to 64-year-olds) with 
no more than a high school education is still 
twice that of the Scandinavian countries. 
It’s also worth noting that the central bank, 
so long compromised by the less-than-arm’s-
length  relationship  between  policymakers 
and the private sector, has never managed to 
make price- and exchange-rate-stability a pri-
ority. One number says it all: Since 1939, when 
the two traded at par, the Icelandic króna has 
lost 99.95 percent of its value relative to its 
mother currency, the Danish krone. 
privatization among friends
Return now to the privatization of Iceland’s 
big banks – in particular, Landsbanki Íslands 
and Búnadarbanki Íslands, two of the largest. 
(The latter was subsequently merged into the 
Kaupthing Bank in 2003). The recent experi-
ence of the Baltic countries in the transition 
from Soviet-style planning offered plenty of 
precedent in how to manage such privatiza-
tions. The idea was to maximize the return to 
the state by casting the net widely for bidders 
and by seeking buyers that could manage in-
ternational  banking  in  a  small  country  de-
pendent on trade and foreign investment.
But in Iceland, the two banks were sold at 
prices  deemed  suspiciously  low  by  the  Na-
tional Audit Office. What’s more, they were 
sold to Icelanders lacking experience in the 
business. 
Why? Because it suited the ruling Indepen-
dence and Progressive parties – or, more pre-
cisely  –  some  leading  politicians  who  saw 
privatization as a chance for their cronies to 
become richer. One major investor was a pol-
itician whose private-sector experience con-
sisted of running two small knitwear factories 
in the provinces in the 1970s for a few months; 
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he  became  an  instant  billionaire.  Another 
needed special legislative treatment to qualify 
because he had been in deep legal trouble in 
Russia.  Previously,  he  had  been  awarded  a 
conditional  prison  sentence  in  Iceland  for 
fraud. To make matters worse, his son and co-
investor was a wheeler-dealer who had made 
his mark on the world stage through shady 
privatization deals in the telecommunications 
business in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. 
Crony capitalism was so much a part of 
daily life in Iceland that this back-scratching 
was openly discussed. Consider an essay cele-
brating the prime minister – one presumably 
published with the subject’s approval – in the 
newspaper Morgunbladid in 2004. The essayist 
wrote that, since the Progressive Party (then 
the second-largest party) had secured its claim 
to the Búnadarbanki, the prime minister “con-
sidered it necessary that Landsbanki would 
land in the hands of persons within at least 
calling distance of the Independence Party.” 
And how, you might wonder, did the ousted 
central bank governor under whose steward-
ship as prime-minister-turned-banker all this 
transpired, fare after the system collapsed? He 
became editor of Morgunbladid – roughly the 
equivalent of making Richard Nixon the edi-
tor of the Washington Post to ensure fair and 
balanced coverage of Watergate.
The point of bank privatization ought to 
have been the creation of independent institu-
tions with incentives to allocate capital to its 
most productive and profitable use. But the 
political culture of Iceland saw it quite differ-
ently: this was a grand opportunity to reward 
friends and family. And in this sense, Iceland, 
which is typically cast as an extension of Scan-
dinavia in the middle of the Atlantic, was (and 
is) very different than its Nordic cousins. 
Privatization thus generated the worst of 
all possible worlds, reducing the stability of 
Iceland’s financial system without increasing 
its  efficiency.  The  government  could  have 
changed  the  banks’  incentives  to  take  enor-
mous risks in search of profit through changes 
in taxes. But it did not – you do not tax your 
friends.  The  central  bank  could  have  con-
tained the explosion of liquidity that followed 
privatization through higher reserve require-
ments. But it did not: on the contrary, it low-
ered  reserve  requirements  in  2002  at  the 
banks’ behest. And – this proved a particu-
larly expensive error – it abolished all reserve 
requirements  on  the  banks’  deposits  at 
branches in other countries. 
Iceland’s Financial Supervision Authority 
had  the  discretion  to  apply  stress  tests,  tai-
lored to the quality and volatility of the banks’ 
assets.  But  it  was  hopelessly  compromised. 
The  banks  routinely  hired  away  personnel 
from the authority at fat salaries, thereby de-
priving it of experienced staff and conveying a 
clear message to those who remained behind.
Free to do what they pleased, the banks 
went  on  an  unprecedented  borrowing  and 
lending spree that increased the assets of the 
banking system from about 100 percent of 
national  income  in  2000  to  an  astonishing 
900 percent in mid-2008. The banks’ business 
model was, in essence, imported from abroad. 
Loan officers were rewarded according to the 
volume  of  loans  they  made,  regardless  of 
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quality. The banks even managed to convince 
large numbers of customers to borrow in for-
eign currencies, even though the customers’ 
earnings were solely in Icelandic currency.
That practice may or may not have been 
legal. But it was certainly imprudent: Com-
paring the market exchange rate of the króna 
with  its  relative  purchasing  power  suggests 
that Icelandic currency was at least 50 percent 
overvalued in 2008. And while it’s true that ex-
change rates often wander far from purchas-
ing-power parity, the idea that most Icelandic 
businesses would bet their futures on the con-
tinuing misalignment of currencies is bizarre.
Lack of due diligence seemed the order of 
the day. The banks claimed to believe – as did 
at least one international rating agency – that 
the  government  continued  to  guarantee  all 
the banks’ liabilities after they were privatized. 
Moreover, the government did little to coun-
ter that impression. The Financial Supervision 
Authority  was  featured  prominently  in  bro-
chures from Landsbanki offering high interest 
rates on British pound sterling “Icesave” ac-
counts  that  foreigners  opened  and  main-
tained over the Internet. 
These  high-interest-rate  accounts  were 
first offered to British depositors in 2006, and 
morphed into a primary source of capital for 
Landsbanki as it became increasingly difficult 
for the bank to borrow abroad through con-
ventional channels. Similar accounts were of-
fered to Dutch depositors in 2008, even after 
the Central Bank of Iceland, the Financial Su-
pervision Authority and the government had 
been sternly warned by foreign central banks 
that Iceland’s banks were headed for collapse. 
During  their  brief  existence,  Icesave  at-
tracted  300,000  depositors  in  Britain  and 
100,000 in the Netherlands. Landsbanki ran 
its  offices  in  those  countries  as  branches 
rather than as subsidiaries, for a very good 
reason: as accounts in foreign subsidiaries, Ic-
esave accounts would have been subject to fi-
nancial supervision by foreign regulators. 
When Landsbanki became terminally illiq-
uid (and surely insolvent) in October 2008, 
the foreign depositors were compensated in 
full by their governments – which, in turn, 
demanded that Iceland pay them back. In ef-
fect, then, Landsbanki managed to make Ice-
land’s  population  of  320,000  liable  for  the 
losses of 400,000 foreign depositors.
Actually, the story gets worse. The banks 
peddled loans as well as complicated financial 
instruments to the holders of fishing quotas 
and farm-production quotas, using the quo-
tas as collateral. They actively encouraged de-
positors to transfer their savings from ordi-
nary accounts covered by government deposit 
insurance to money-market accounts paying 
higher  interest,  implying  that  the  money-
market  accounts  were  also  government- 
guaranteed.  The  banks  also  provided  large 
loans  without  collateral  to  customers  who 
wanted to speculate on the foreign-exchange 
market. And they lent members of their own 
senior staffs huge sums to buy shares in the 
banks, using only the shares as collateral.
folly proves infectious
Iceland’s  financial  mania  extended  well  be-
yond the banking system. Between 2001 and 
2007, stock market shares rose an average of 
44 percent annually – a world record. Mean-
while, house prices rose two-and-a-half-fold. 
When Robert Aliber, an economist from the 
University of Chicago, visited Iceland in 2007, 
he predicted a bust within a year. “You only 
need to count the cranes,” quipped the pro-
fessor, an expert on asset bubbles. 
And, of course, Aliber was right. Iceland 
became the first wealthy country to seek help 
from the IMF since Britain extended a palm 
in  1976.  The  massive  rescue  package  also 
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drew on money from the Nordic countries, 
Poland and the European Union. 
As  part  of  its  recovery  plan,  the  govern-
ment split the three failed banks into “new” 
banks and “old” ones. The new banks took 
over domestic deposits and provided uninter-
rupted banking services at home – no small 
feat under the circumstances – and received 
fresh injections of capital from taxpayers. The 
old banks were left with the dodgy assets and 
foreign debts that will largely have to be writ-
ten off in the ensuing liquidations, no doubt 
triggering litigation from disappointed over-
seas creditors. In effect, the banks were rena-
tionalized on the model used by Nordic gov-
ernments to handle their own banking crises 
of 1988 to 1993. Iceland ultimately plans to 
re-privatize  the  new  banks  by  exchanging 
their debts for equity – inviting, at long last, 
foreign ownership. 
Some  other  businesses,  by  the  way,  suf-
fered the same fate in the crisis as the banks. 
One of the largest insurance companies, as 
well as the iconic national airline – the airline 
that  millions  of  Europeans  and  Americans 
have used over the decades to cross the Atlan-
tic – had to be nationalized. No doubt other 
businesses will follow.
Iceland’s  economic  crisis  has  destroyed 
wealth that was equivalent to approximately 
seven  times  the  country’s  annual  income  – 
that’s  right,  seven  times  GDP.  The  damage 
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that was inflicted on foreign creditors and de-
positors  amounts  to  about  five  times  Ice-
land’s national income, while the losses thrust 
upon  Icelandic  residents  amount  to  about 
twice income.
With the benefit of hindsight, it’s clear how 
all this happened. The absence of checks and 
balances gradually eroded the inhibitions of 
unprincipled  politicians  and  their  greedy 
counterparts in the private sector. When, for 
example, the National Economic Institute, a 
decades-old institution set up to offer impar-
tial economic counsel to the government, was 
no longer found to be obliging enough, it was 
disbanded – on the grounds, among others, 
that the recently privatized banks’ economic-
research departments could fill the gap. And 
when the Competition Authority raided the 
offices of oil companies in search of evidence 
of price collusion, it was summarily abolished 
and then reincarnated under new, more com-
pliant management. Iceland, you see, is not so 
much a scaled-down version of Scandinavia 
as it is an amalgam of Italy, Japan and Russia, 
with a dash of Denmark for show.
The people of Iceland have expressed their 
anger at the political establishment, sweeping 
both  the  Independence  Party  and  the  Pro-
gressive Party into opposition at once for the 
first  time  in  history.  Even  before  the  crash, 
opinion polls showed that only 30 percent of 
Icelanders had confidence in the parliament 
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or  the  judicial  system.  The  public’s  percep-
tion of those who brought down the econ-
omy was neatly captured by the writer Einar 
Már Gudmundsson in a story about a canni-
bal flying first class. When a flight attendant 
hands him the menu, he looks at it and says: 
“Nothing on the menu strikes my fancy. Could 
you please show me the passenger list?”
reading the tea leaves
Iceland  now  faces  gross  public  and  private 
foreign debt equivalent to about 300 percent 
of national income, even after writing off pri-
vate debts equivalent to another 500 percent. 
The government was thus forced to spend al-
most as much on interest payments in 2009 
as on health care and social insurance. 
There is bound to be friction over how this 
interest  burden  is  apportioned  in  coming 
years. A decade ago, Iceland could boast of an 
income distribution similar to that of egali-
tarian Scandinavia. But, due in large part to a 
reduction in tax rates on high earners, the 
distribution  is  now  closer  to  that  of  the 
United  States. And  in  the  lean  years  ahead, 
there will be pressure to pare government in-
come transfers. That spells trouble for a gov-
ernment asking for the major sacrifice in liv-
ing  standards  needed  to  repay  Iceland’s 
external debts. 
It’s not surprising, then, that the burden 
has been likened to the reparations imposed 
on Germany at Versailles, and some observers 
predict equivalent consequences – though ob-
viously ones that will concern the world less.
There  are  still  some  optimists  out  there, 
however. Those who focus on Iceland’s strong 
fundamentals remain hopeful that the coun-
try can get back on its feet within a few (albeit 
difficult)  years.  For  while  the  economy  re-
mains dependent on a mature fishing indus-
try for two-fifths of its export earnings, it still 
has great potential to grow in other sectors. 
Abundant  hydropower  and  virtually  unlim-
ited geothermal resources make it an ideal lo-
cation for producers of energy-intensive ma-
terials like aluminum and ferrosilicon. And, 
thanks  to  its  highly  educated  technocratic 
elite, Iceland has had some striking successes 
in developing information technology.
Recovery  must  rest  on  two  pillars.  First, 
the government will have to implement the 
IMF’s  reconstruction  program.  Iceland’s  be-
lated  application  for  EU  membership  (and 
the implied willingness to follow EU rules on 
governance) is evidence that the government 
really does intend to clean up its act. 
Second,  Iceland’s  political  establishment 
must face up to the causes of the collapse, in-
cluding the massive failure of policy and in-
stitutions in the absence of checks and bal-
ances.  For  this  to  be  done  properly,  the 
country will need objective analysis from out-
siders.  The  government,  however,  remains 
unwilling  to  appoint  an  international  com-
mission, and that risks a deepening crisis of 
confidence if a home-grown review doesn’t 
convince the public that the skeletons aren’t 
being buried. 
Happily, the government has accepted an 
offer  of  help  from  Eva  Joly,  a  renowned 
French-Norwegian  investigative  magistrate 
who led an investigation of the oil giant Elf 
Aquitaine, arguably the biggest fraud inquiry 
in Europe of the postwar era.
For those who take the long view, Iceland’s 
fall from grace should not be all that surpris-
ing. In the 19th century, the tail end of the 
Little  Ice  Age,  the  worsening  climate  effec-
tively  destroyed  Iceland’s  agricultural  econ-
omy and forced a good portion of the popu-
lation  to  emigrate.  But  Iceland  is  also  a 
country that has made the most of relatively 
little  through  hard  work  and  a  knack  for 
adapting to change. Don’t count it out just 
yet. m